Comments on: Security questions and cheese-o 3+ “factor” authentication http://www.redmonk.com/cote/2007/02/21/security-questions-and-cheese-o-3-factor-authentication/ One foot in the muck, the other in utopia Tue, 22 May 2012 08:23:12 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.2 By: cote http://www.redmonk.com/cote/2007/02/21/security-questions-and-cheese-o-3-factor-authentication/comment-page-1/#comment-9411 cote Fri, 23 Feb 2007 15:33:14 +0000 http://www.redmonk.com/cote/2007/02/21/security-questions-and-cheese-o-3-factor-authentication/#comment-9411 Good any ideas for those browser changes? ;) Good any ideas for those browser changes? ;)

]]> By: Mark Cathcart http://www.redmonk.com/cote/2007/02/21/security-questions-and-cheese-o-3-factor-authentication/comment-page-1/#comment-9199 Mark Cathcart Thu, 22 Feb 2007 22:42:24 +0000 http://www.redmonk.com/cote/2007/02/21/security-questions-and-cheese-o-3-factor-authentication/#comment-9199 Bank of America has been asking you to verify your "site key" plus a user chosen text phrase for almost 2-years now. You are presented with the user chosen image and phrase and then asked for the equivalent of a user chosen password. For me it's the best of a bad bunch. Sure, I'd like some form of 3rd party authentication that doesn't allow the server I'm connecting to to know anything about my authentication, but will allow me to connect when authenticated log me on. However, usually when I give this any real thought, I can think of 10-reasons why this isn't such a good idea. It needs a seed change in the way browsers are built in order to make me think we could pull this off. Bank of America has been asking you to verify your "site key" plus a user chosen text phrase for almost 2-years now.

You are presented with the user chosen image and phrase and then asked for the equivalent of a user chosen password. For me it's the best of a bad bunch.

Sure, I'd like some form of 3rd party authentication that doesn't allow the server I'm connecting to to know anything about my authentication, but will allow me to connect when authenticated log me on.

However, usually when I give this any real thought, I can think of 10-reasons why this isn't such a good idea. It needs a seed change in the way browsers are built in order to make me think we could pull this off.

]]> By: cote http://www.redmonk.com/cote/2007/02/21/security-questions-and-cheese-o-3-factor-authentication/comment-page-1/#comment-9063 cote Thu, 22 Feb 2007 14:54:05 +0000 http://www.redmonk.com/cote/2007/02/21/security-questions-and-cheese-o-3-factor-authentication/#comment-9063 Thanks for looking that up a leaving the pointer, Mark. Awesome! Thanks for looking that up a leaving the pointer, Mark. Awesome!

]]> By: Mark Wahl http://www.redmonk.com/cote/2007/02/21/security-questions-and-cheese-o-3-factor-authentication/comment-page-1/#comment-9053 Mark Wahl Thu, 22 Feb 2007 12:39:12 +0000 http://www.redmonk.com/cote/2007/02/21/security-questions-and-cheese-o-3-factor-authentication/#comment-9053 The 'law' you're thinking of is probably the FFIEC guidance on authentication for Internet banking. "The agencies consider single-factor authentication, as the only control mechanism, to be inadequate for high-risk transactions involving access to customer information or the movement of funds to other parties." The focus of the guidance is on risk assessment and management, not so much on user experience. There's probably scope for some usability studies as the different techniques (OTP token, scratchcard, image, secret question etc) have found deployment. <a href="http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/authentication_guidance.pdf" rel="nofollow">http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/authentication_guidance....</a> The 'law' you're thinking of is probably the FFIEC guidance on authentication for Internet banking. "The agencies consider single-factor authentication, as the only control mechanism, to be inadequate for high-risk transactions involving access to customer information or the movement of funds to other parties." The focus of the guidance is on risk assessment and management, not so much on user experience. There's probably scope for some usability studies as the different techniques (OTP token, scratchcard, image, secret question etc) have found deployment.
http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/authentication_guidance….

]]> By: cote http://www.redmonk.com/cote/2007/02/21/security-questions-and-cheese-o-3-factor-authentication/comment-page-1/#comment-9029 cote Thu, 22 Feb 2007 09:24:19 +0000 http://www.redmonk.com/cote/2007/02/21/security-questions-and-cheese-o-3-factor-authentication/#comment-9029 Richard: I agree, as the rest of the post hopefully shows. What I was meaning -- and hoping to point out with the "technologically" prefix -- was that it's a nifty idea from a purely code monkey context. Usable and nice for end-users, now that's whole 'nuter sotry. Richard: I agree, as the rest of the post hopefully shows. What I was meaning — and hoping to point out with the "technologically" prefix — was that it's a nifty idea from a purely code monkey context. Usable and nice for end-users, now that's whole 'nuter sotry.

]]> By: Ric http://www.redmonk.com/cote/2007/02/21/security-questions-and-cheese-o-3-factor-authentication/comment-page-1/#comment-8992 Ric Thu, 22 Feb 2007 07:14:17 +0000 http://www.redmonk.com/cote/2007/02/21/security-questions-and-cheese-o-3-factor-authentication/#comment-8992 Notice you're using the same bank as me - fun isn't it? My wife has the same trouble as yours ... I can't wait until web identity is sorted a hell of a lot better than it is now. Notice you’re using the same bank as me – fun isn’t it? My wife has the same trouble as yours …

I can’t wait until web identity is sorted a hell of a lot better than it is now.

]]> By: Richard G Brown http://www.redmonk.com/cote/2007/02/21/security-questions-and-cheese-o-3-factor-authentication/comment-page-1/#comment-9000 Richard G Brown Thu, 22 Feb 2007 03:18:51 +0000 http://www.redmonk.com/cote/2007/02/21/security-questions-and-cheese-o-3-factor-authentication/#comment-9000 [on the new scheme that asks people to look for a specific image and, if it's not there, to become suspicious]: "to his core point, technologically, it’s nifty and fun." I'm not so sure it is. We have to remember that the vast majority (let's say "all" to the first approximation) of internet users are busy people for whom a log-on screen is an irritation. It's stopping them from doing the task they really want to do. I don't see how a security mechanism that relies on one spotting the *absence* of a step in a process is going to work: people just won't notice. Or if they do, will probably just think to themselves: "neat! They got rid of an annoying step. I can do my banking more quickly!" [on the new scheme that asks people to look for a specific image and, if it's not there, to become suspicious]: "to his core point, technologically, it’s nifty and fun."

I'm not so sure it is. We have to remember that the vast majority (let's say "all" to the first approximation) of internet users are busy people for whom a log-on screen is an irritation. It's stopping them from doing the task they really want to do.

I don't see how a security mechanism that relies on one spotting the *absence* of a step in a process is going to work: people just won't notice. Or if they do, will probably just think to themselves: "neat! They got rid of an annoying step. I can do my banking more quickly!"

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